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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE:
This is an appeal from a decision and order of the First
Judicial District Court awarding plaintiffs judgment in the amount
of $18,023.50 for default on a contract by the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT:
v

This case was tried before the court sitting without a jury;

the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christoffersen, presiding, judgment was
granted for plaintiffs in the amount of $18,023.50 plus interest at
the rate of 5 1/2 percent per annum from July 1, 1973, to date of
judgment plus attorneys fees in the amount of $2,000.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL:
Respondents request that this court sustain the lower court's
decision and order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS;
On May 1, 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Wanlass, hereinafter referred to
as the buyers, purchased a farm from Mr. and Mrs. Williamson, hereinafter referred to as the sellers.

The buyers financed most of the

purchase price through a banking institution, but they financed
$20,000.00 of the sale price by giving the sellers a $20,000.00
installment note (See plaintiff's Exhibit #2).
The note provided that monthly payments of $163.42 were to
be made on the 1st day of each month.

The note also provided that

the makers, (the buyers)
"waive presentment for payment and notice of
non-payment of this note."
The note further provided:
"if any installment is not paid at the time it
becomes due the holders of this note, at their
option, may declare the whole due and payable
%

.."

The buyers were late on 15 of the 25 payments made (T.71).
The sellers were depending upon the payments to be timely made in
order to pay obligations they had (T.60).
On at least two separate occasions Mrs. Williamson (seller)
telephoned Mrs. Wanlass (buyer) to tell her that the payments must
be made on the due dates.

(T.114-115).

On February 20, 1973, the sellers, also, had their attorney
'

~ 2 -

•

send a letter and notice to the buyers advising them that payments
must be made on time and that if the buyers were late the sellers could
"declare the full amount due and payable, which if they are aggravated
"declare the full amount due and payable, which if they are aggravated,
they will pursue."

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

On August 3, 1973, a notice of default was sent to the buyers
notifying them that the entire amount was declared due and payable
for failure to make payments for July and August, 1973.

(See

Plaintiff's Exhibit #3).
Following this notice, a suit was brought and the parties
stipulated that the note would be sued upon without any requirement
to foreclose any collateral forming security to the note, and
the defendants also waived any right they had under the requirements to
foreclose under the one-action rule for real estate mortgages.
(See T. 3-6).
The Trial Court listened to the testimony given by the
witnesses and viewed the exhibits and other evidence, and the
Tftal Court was familiar with the Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed by each party, and the Trial Court, after making its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs.
POINT I
THE CASES DEALING WITH FORFEITURES AND
FORECLOSURES UNDER UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
CONTRACTS HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THIS
CASE SINCE IT IS A SUIT TO ENFORCE A
PROMISSORY NOTE.

The defendants cite LaMont v. Evjen, 29 U2d 266, 508 P2d
532 (1973) ^ and other, cases, for^the proposition that before the
plaintiffs can accelerate the balance due under a promissory note
they must give the defendants notice of default and a reasonable
amount of time in which to bring the contract current.
A careful reading of the LaMont case is necessary to set in
perspective the rules of law it discusses.

The decision concerns

a Uniform Real Estate* Contract, and the Court's holding was:
"It appears that the plaintiffs failed to establish
that they gave noti,ce to the defendants of their
election to trea't the contract as a note and mortgage
prior to full tender of the amount due. Besides the
defendants were not given a reasonable time in which
to make good the delinquent installment.0
(emphasis added)
Under the facts of the LaMont decision, it appears that the
defendants tendered the amount due prior to the election of
plaintiffs to declare the entire amount due and payable.

(The

court cited Romero v. Schmidt, 15U2d 300,392 P2d 3J 1964) and
Home Owners' Loan Corporation vs. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161 P2d
355, (1945)).
The court also noted that the default was overlooked by all
parties'for some fifteen months, and impliedly suggests that this
may work an estoppel or waiver on the contract being declared to
be due and owing.

y

There are several reasons why the law applicable to Uniform
Real Estate Contracts has no bearing upon this case.

Fi^rst of all, this case does not deal with any forfeiture of
interest nor does it* deal with the foreclosure of real property or
other collateral.

The sellers were not attempting to penalize the

buyers by taking property in which the buyers had established an
equity.

When a plaintiff is not seeking the harsh remedies avail-

able under a Uniform Real Estate Contract, it makes no sense to
afford the defendants all of the protection given to reduce inequitable forfeitures and foreclosures.
The California case of Messner v. Mallory, 236 P2d 898 (Cal.
App. 1951) points out this fact.clearly.

In this case the seller

had sold to the buyers, his interest in an automobile dealership
and as part of the transaction the buyers executed a promissory
note in the amount of $25,000.00 to the seller, a retiring partner*
The payments were to be made on th$ 1st day of each month commencing
on the 1st day of September, 1949. Each continuing partner was to
pay $200.00 per month.

One of the partners made his payments reg-

ularly but the second partner's payments were late for five of the
nine months the contract was in existence.

One partner's check

for the June, 1950, payment was made on time but the other partner's
payment was late.

On June 5, 1950, the seller sent a letter to both

buyers declaring the entire balance due and payable.

Subsequently,

on the 7th day of the month the seller refused the buyer's tender
of his check.
•

•

•

.

•

•

*

'

•

»

.

'

•

The buyer argued that the exercise of the acceleration clause
o
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by the seller amounted to a forfeiture and that the seller had
waived his right to declare a default and was estopped to do so,
and that the court should reform the contract to relieve the buyers
of any default.

The court heard the arguments and held that the

seller was entitled to accelerate payments.

The court stated:

"A provision in an agreement for accelerated
maturity is not in the nature of a penalty
or forfeiture, but simply an agreement as
to the time when a debt shall become due and
enforceable according to its terms. Such an
agreement is a lawful one which the parties
may enter into and when they do so the conditions will be enforced by courts of equity.
No forfeiture is involved in such act, and
no penalty imposed. Plaintiff is not asking
for anything that has been paid under the
contract by way of forfeiture, but is simply
refusing to extend credit for the reason that
the defendant has failed to comply with his
contract. The situation is entirely different from an agreement of sale wherein, upon
failure of payment of an installment the
vendor is attempting to retain payments made
and also the property itself, the subject of
the sale."
The Washington Court has also examined this question and
in*Jacobson v^ McClanahan, £3 Wash 2d751,264P2d253 (1953) the
court discussed the difference between acceleration and forfeitures and stated:
"Equity abhors forfeitures and penalties,
but acceleration of payments on a mortgage
is not a 'forfeiture' or a 'penalty'".
Utah courts have also upheld acceleration clauses as
being valid.

See Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. Neilsen,

26U2d383,490P2d328(1971).
-6
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Several other jurisdictions have also upheld acceleration
clauses as being valid and enforceable against a defaulting creditor.
(See: Baltimore Life Insurance Company v. Harn, 1^ Ariz. App. 78,
486 P2d 190, Review denied 108 Ariz. 192, 494P2dl322 (1971); Federal
Nat. Mortgage Assfn v. Walter, 363 P2d 293 (Okl. 1961); Puget Sound
Mut. Sav. Bank v. Lillions, 50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P2d 935, Cert,
denied, 357 U. S. 926,2 L.Ed.2d 1371,78 S.Ct. 1373 (1957).
From a practical viewpoint this controversy resolves itself
around the question of who ought to bear the costs of financing the
credit remaining to be paid on the promissory note.

If the Court

agrees with the sellers -the only damage the buyers will entail will
be the* costs of refinancing the note and paying it off at once.

If

the Court holds for the buyers, the sellers will be required to
extend credit to the buyers.

The

evidence clearly shows the

buyers were repeatedly late, the records showing 15 late payments out of the 25 made, and the buyers were notified twice by
telephone calls and"once by letter from an attorney that payments
must be made on time.

By enforcing the terms of the npte the

Court Is not penalizing any interest of the buyers, but the
Court is merely enforcing the terms of an.agreement which the
buyers signed and agreed to be bound to.

After the buyers failed

to pay the payments as they agreed to do, the sellers were entitled
to ask for the total money due them.

The sellers are merely

asking that someone else extend credit to the buyers for the reason
m

-

i
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that the buyers have failed to honor their agreement and have failed
to comply with the contract by making timely payments.
As is pointed by the California court, in Messner, the
sellers in this action are not asking for a forfeiture of any
interest of the buyers.

The sellers are merely asking that the

agreement, signed by the parties be enforced.

That agreement being

that if the sellers "failed to make timely payments on the promissory
note that the whole note would become due and.payable at once.
As the Arizona Court pointed out in Baltimore Life Ins. Co.
v. Ham, supra,

ff

acceleration clauses" are bargained for elements

of mortgages and notes, after the repeated delinquent payments
by the buyers, the sellers are entitled to have the terms of their
agreement upheld.
Secondly, the buyers on two separate occasions waived any
protection such rules of law may have afforded them.

First off,

in signing the note the buyers agreed that they would "waive any
notice of non-payment".

After waiving the notice requirement, by

signing the note, the buyers are now seeking to have this Court
enforce against the sellers the very requirements for notice which
they previously waived.

v

In addition the buyers further waived any notice requirements
when they stipulated that the action would be tried strictly on
the enforceability of the acceleration clause of the installment
note.

The parties agreed that the one-action rule, if it had any

application, would be waived and that the collateral secured by
the note would not be foreclosed.
By waiving their right to make the sellers undergo foreclosure
proceedings the buyers also waived the protection such proceedings
might have afforded them.

They certainly are not entitled to

keep the collateral which secured the promissory note, and at the
same time insist upon the rules of law which apply to forfeiture
proceedings under the Uniform Real Estate Contracts.
Thirdly, after the buyers waived any application the oneaction rule might have afforded them and after they stipulated that
the suit would be tried on the enforceability of the acceleration
clause, the cause of action resolves itself around the rules
governing promissory notes.
Promissory notes are now governed by the provisions of
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

Under the Utah Code Anno.

§70A-3-104 (Repl. Vol 1968) it is clear that Plaintifffs Exhibit
No. 2, the installment note, is a negotiable instrument as defined
by the Commercial Code.

Utah Code Anno. §70A-3-122 (Repl. Vol.

1968) provides that a cause of action against the maker accrues
on the day after maturity.

Since the note provided for monthly

payments the sellers would have a cause of action accrue on the
2nd day of each month if the payment was not paid on the due date,
0

the 1st of each month.

When dealing with promissory notes there

is no notice and other requirements to be complied with as are
necessary when dealing with Uniform Real Estate Contracts.
-9-

The Lamont case itself points this out.

One of the reasons

for the necessity of notice of default is that several options
are available to a seller under Uniform Real

Estate Contracts,

and a mere failure to pay does not make the debt due, but affirmative
action by the seller must be taken to declare the whole debt due.
However, with promissory notes the debt becomes due "the
day after maturity".

This is particularly so where the buyers

"waive notice of non-payment".
Thus, the rules applicable to Uniform Real Estate Contracts
do not apply to this case, since it involves a promissory note, and
since the buyers have waived any right they may have had to such
protection.
'

POINT II

EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT
THE RULES DEALING WITH FORFEITURES AND
FORECLOSURES OF UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS SHOULD APPLY TO THIS CASE, THE
BUYERS RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF SUCH PROTECTION.
The evidence before the court shows that the sellers received
late payments on 15 of the 25 payments made but the sellers never
acquiesed in or accepted the late payments. The evidence is clear
that at least on two occasions Mrs. Williamson told Mrs. Wanlass,
that payments were to be made on time.

The evidence also shows

that on February 20, 1973* a letter was sent by Charles P. Olson
(see PI. Ex. #3) notifying the defendants that their late payments
were inconveniencing the Williamsons and that the Williamsons "have
certain remedies under their contract such as declaring the full
-10-

amount due and payable, which, if they are aggravated, they will
pursue".
Again PI. Ex. #4 dated August 3, 1973, gave notice that payments were late and that the sellers were exercising their rights
of acceleration.
There is no evidence that the plaintifffs lead the defendants
to believe that they would not require timely payments, so the
plaintiffs4could not be estopped to demand timely payments. Also,
there is nothing to indicate the sellers waived timely payments.
Since the sellers were not a financial institution but only
individuals selling a farm it is hard to conceive of what better
notice the buyers could have received to notify them that payments
would have to be made on time.
There is no question that the buyers had received notice
on at least three separate occasions that payments must be made
when due, before the note was accelerated.
Under the test laid down by LaMont, supra, and other cases
dealing with Uniform Real Estate Contracts it is clear that these
buyers repeatedly received notice that acceleration would take
place if payments were late.

*

The July payment and August payment were not mailed until
August 7, 1973.
In view of the fact that acceleration took place several
days before the payments were mailed, and in view of the fact
that the buyers were over a month late, the requirements to de-1X~\

clare an option and a reasonable time to pay were met and the
buyers were obligated to pay the entire note.
This is particularly so when no forfeiture or foreclosure was
involved, when the parties were private individuals, and when the
buyers had waived their rights to such protection.
POINT III
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AND THE
DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED."

The July payment was never received by the sellers. The
buyers claimed that they had mailed the payment to the sellers,
which claim was the only evidence that a payment had been mailed.
However, the history of paying showed that on several occasions
they were three months late in making payments.

The check and

envelope were never found and they were never returned to the
buyers.

From this the Trial Court could certainly draw a reasonable

inference that the check was never mailed.
The buyers own check stub (Def. Ex #20) shows that the check
which was supposed to have been mailed for the July 1, 1973
payment was not dated until July 9, 1973, which would be at least
9 days late when made, by the evidence most favorable to the buyers.
The August payment was in an envelope post-marked August
7, 1973 (see PI. Ex #8) the same day Mr. Wanlass, the buyer,
claimed to have received notice of acceleration, and the check
inside the envelope shows that the check was dated August 1, 1973.
•

'

.

.

'

•

'

'

•

.

f
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•

(PI. Ex. #8). Therefore, the date of a check would not have any
bearing upon the day the check may have been mailed, in fact the
buyers admitted the date of a check and the date mailed wouldn't
be the same date (T.100).
The notice of acceleration (Pi. Ex. #3) was mailed on August
3, 1973 but the defendant claims he didn't receive it until August
7, 1973f and he further claims that he mailed his August payment
before getting the notice, even though the envelope containing the
payment was post-marked on August 7f 1973, (see PI. Ex. #8) the
date the notice was admitted to have been received.
The trial court was able to see the demeanor of the witnesses
and was able to see the seemingly conflicting statements of the
buyer together with the tangible exhibits.

The trial court was

in a favorable position to determine the credibility of witnesses
and testimony.
against

His decision should not be disturbed unless it is

the weight of the evidence.

In this case the appellants attempt to relate the facts most
favorable to their position; but, there is sufficient information
* to support the findings and judgment of the Trial Court.

The Trial

Court's decision and judgment should not be overturned if there is
sufficient evidence together with reasonable inferences to support
the judgment.

Numerous cases have held that the Utah Supreme

Court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustain
the lower court's decision and the lower court's findings will
not be disturbed unless they fairly manifest against the weight
^13-

of the evidence or clearly indicate the Court misapplied the law
to the established facts.
Utah cases stressing this point are extremely numerous.

See

First Security Bank of Utah N. A. v. Wright, 521 P2d.563 (1974);
Howarth v. Ostergard, 30 Utah 2d 183,515P2d 444(1973); Barrett v.
Vickers,24 Utah 2d 334, 471 P2d 157 (1970).
The evidence together with the reasonable inferences therefrom is certainly sufficient to support the Trial Court's findings
o

that the July and August payments were not made until after August
7, 1973, the day the defendants received notice the contract was
accelerated.
,

POINT IV
IF THE- COURT SHOULD DETERMINE
THAT THERE IS COMPELLING EVIDENCE TO BELIEVE THE JULY PAYMENT WAS MAILED THE RISK OF LOSS
FOR NON-DELIVERY STILL RESTS UPON
THE BUYERS.

As was pointed out previously there is sufficient in'••..

'

•

formation from which the Trial Court could have found or could
% have based a reasonable inference that the July payment was never
mailed. .
However, even if the Court should find that the July payment
was mailed, the risk of loss falls upon the buyers. As stated in
60 AM Jur 2d, "Payments" 17. The general rule for determining
risk of loss through the mail is as follows:

• -14- •,'

"An obligor is bound to pay his obligee in
person or by agent, and does not discharge
his obligation merely by making all reasonable efforts to transmit to the obligee the
amount due him. An obligor cannot select
his obligee's agent to receive payment, even
if he selects the United States mails or
other public carrier. Therefore, depositing
in the mail a letter containing money and
addressed to the obligee does not discharge
the obligation if the remittance is not
received by the obligee, unless the obligee '
has expressly or by implication directed or
consented that payment be so made. Stated
in another way, in order to absolve a debtor
who transmits money by mail to his creditor
for the payment of his debt from the hazard
of loss in the transmission, it is necessary
that he show authority from the creditor to
to remit in this manner, or a usuage or
course of dealing from which such authority
may be inferred."
A California case, Blumer v. Kirkman Corp., 24lP2dl7 (1952)
also discusses this general rule and states:
"Payment is not effectuated by sending the
amount due to the creditor by mail or other
public carrier until the remittance gets into
the hands of the creditor, unless he expressly
or by implication directs or consents that
payment be sd made ***. A mere general direction by a creditor to his debtor to remit
money to him ordinarily does not constitute
a direction or consent that remittance be
made by mail at the creditor's risk ***#tf
70 C.J.S.,Payment, s 7, p. 218.

4

The question appears to be whether the Williamsons "expressly
or by implication" directed or consented that payment be made by
mail."
In determining this question a look at PI. Ex. #2 shows
that payment was to have been made at Hyrum, Cache County, Utah.
'

- 1 5 -

'•'

There is nothing to show an "express" consent to receive payments
by mail.

The buyers argue in their brief that a "course of

performance" was established by the parties and therefore the
plaintiffs by "implication" consented to payment by mail.
However, under Utah Code Anno, s 70A-2-208 (Repl. Vol.
1968), the course of performance must be "accepted or acquiesed in
without objection".
mailed late.

The evidence is clear that most payments were

However, the plaintiffs objected to late payments on

at least three occasions and therefore no "implied consent" could
be inferred sufficient to put the loss of payment on the sellers
for the reason that the sellers were objecting to payments which
were made by mail.

>

As a practical matter the sellers did not care by what mode
payments were made by the buyers, but they did want them on time.
The testimony of the Williamsons was that they wanted to be paid
on the due date, and that they were not going to accept late payments.
After the sellers insisted upon the payments being timely
made, the buyers, who had been making late payments by mail, could
not then claim that the sellers had accepted payments without
objection.

The buyers were aware that payments were required to

be timely made.

After the buyers had been put on notice that the note

would be accelerated if payments were late, the buyers then were
required to bear the risk that the U.S. mails might be late in
delivering payment and that the payments could be lost.

-16-

By in-

\

sisting on timely payments the sellers refused to make the UQ S#
mail their agent.

And the sellers accepted the risks of delay

or loss by using the mail after being notified that the sellers
were insisting on timely payments.
POINT V
•

THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS FREELY
SIGNED BY THE BUYERS AND THE
NOTE SHOULD BE ENFORCED AGAINST
THEM.
The buyers attempt to relieve themselves from the terms of
the promissory note, on the basis that both parties relied upon
the same attorney, is totally spurious.
The attorney the buyers are claiming failed to adequately
represent them was one of the leading attorneys of Logan prior to
his recent, untimely death.

At the trial the attorney testified

forthrightly and candidly and his testimony covered thirty-two
pages (T. 3-42) . There is not one thing in his testimony or that
of any other witness to indicate that Mr. Olson did anything improper or failed to represent the buyers.
The buyers claim that they should somehow be relieved from
the acceleration because Mr. Olson did not represent them solely
is totally unfounded in both the law and the facts. Mr. Wanlass1
(buyer) own testimony was that he didnft think he could excuse
himself from the terms of a note'he signed (T.110)*

<

The buyers also argue that acceleration can only take place
in good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired;
•

»

.
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This is true under the Commercial Code, Utah Code Anno, s 70A1-208 (Repl. Vol. 1968), but it refers only to acceleration
clauses based on Mat will" or "when deemed insecure". Sec. 70A-1-208
dealing with "at will" clauses has no application to this note. '
As the California Court stated in Messner v. Mallory, supra:
"A provision in an agreement for accelerated
maturity is not in the nature of a penalty or
forfeiture, but simply an agreement as to the
time when a debt shall become due and enforceable according to its terms. Such an agreement
is a lawful one which the parties may enter into
and when they do so the conditions will be enforced by courts of equity. No forfeiture is
involved in such act, and no penalty imposed.
Plaintiff is not asking for anything that has
been paid under the contract by way of forfeiture,
but is simply refusing to extend credit for the
reason that the defendant has failed to comply
with his contract. The situation is entirely
different from an agreement of sale wherein,
upon failure of payment of an installment the
vendor is attempting to retain payments made
and also the property itself, the subject of
the sale."
CONCLUSION
There has been no showing in appellants brief that the
^Trial Court had misapplied either the law or the facts in this
case.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that the case law dealing
with Uniform Real Estate Contracts has no bearing, since this is
a case dealing with a promissory note and since the buyers waived
their rights and agreed that the matter could be tried without any
foreclosure of property.
In addition, the buyers were'repeatedly notified to make
•
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their payments when they came due.
The sellers are not trying to forfeit or foreclose any
interest of the buyers, they are merely asking that the terms
of the agreement be enforced.
From all of the evidence it is clear the buyers are the
parties in default and the sellers are the innocent party. '
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court's
decision and judgment be affirmed together with costs awarded
to the respondents.
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